

2025 WL 3780673 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)

Superior Court of California,
Civil Division,
Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 68.
Los Angeles County

Darian WILKINS,

v.

CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, a California Corporation.

No. 25STCV10252.

December 29, 2025.

*1 10:03 AM

Judicial Assistant: Anita Williams

Courtroom Assistant: None

CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

Order

Honorable [Stephen P. Pfahler](#), Judge.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Ruling on Submitted Matter

The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 12/18/2025 for Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Proceedings, now rules as follows:

RULING: Granted.

Requests for Judicial Notice: Granted.

· The court takes judicial notice of the existence of the trial Court orders, but not any factual findings. ([Kilroy v. State of California \(2004\) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 147-148](#); [Sosinsky v. Grant \(1992\) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565](#).) The orders also constitute unpublished material, and are therefore not citable for any reference. ([Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115\(a\)](#); [Rittiman v. Public Utilities Com. \(2022\) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1043 \(footnote 18\)](#).)

· The court takes judicial notice of JAMS arbitration standards and fees for purposes of considering the unconscionability positions. The court also takes judicial notice of its own fee schedule.

Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Bryan Hickey: Overruled.

Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai) moves to compel arbitration on the complaint of plaintiff Darian Wilkins. Defendant moves to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (Arbitration Agreement). Defendant maintains all claims are subject to arbitration under the terms of the Agreement; nothing in the Agreement is precluded under the Ending Force Arbitration Act (EFAA) in that Plaintiff lacks underlying facts establishing exclusion; and the Agreement in no way presents unconscionable terms. Plaintiff in opposition challenge

enforcement of the Agreement on the grounds of the lack of evidence of an executed Agreement; exemption under the EFAA; and unconscionability on the basis of an improper adhesion contract. Defendant in reply reiterates the existence of the admissible signed Agreement, denies any unconscionability, and challenges any sexual harassment preemption on grounds of the timing of the claims and passage of the EFAA.

The court first considers the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). “This Agreement shall be enforceable under and subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.” [Declaration of Bryan Hickey, Ex. B.] Cedars-Sinai represents the provision of medical care to Medicare recipients constitutes interstate commerce. [Hickey Decl.] The representation also represents other interstate commerce activities with both out of state patients and vendors as well. The court finds the representation sufficiently meets the requirement for interstate commerce and application of FAA rules. (See [Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas](#) (1991) 500 U.S. 322, 327 [111 S.Ct. 1842, 1846, 114 L.Ed.2d 366].)

Barring a conflict supporting a preemption of a specific provision under FAA, the court adheres to the California standard for compelling arbitration in that FAA and California adhere to the same standards for review of arbitration agreements. The court finds no conflict with the FAA under the terms of the agreement. ([Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University](#) (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 477–479; [Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC](#) (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346; see [Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.](#) (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1119; [Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana](#) (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906.)

*2 “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

The law continues to create a general presumption in favor of arbitration. In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. ““Under “both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.”” (Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 855, 861.) “Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties and is governed by contract law. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin’l Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165; Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Ctr., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.) Any challenges to the formation of the arbitration agreement should be considered before any order sending the parties to arbitration. The trier of fact weighs all evidence, including affidavits, declarations, documents, and, if applicable, oral testimony to determine whether the action goes to arbitration. (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Ctr., Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.)

Here, Defendant presents a copy of the arbitration Agreement. [Hickey Decl., Ex. B.] Plaintiff challenges the foundation and authentication of the Agreement. The declaration of Hickey references the onboarding process, which includes a period for employees to make any requests. [Hickey Decl., ¶ 5.] While the timeframe remains unclear, the court accepts the existence of the executed Agreement, and existence of the onboarding process. Plaintiff otherwise concedes to executing the Agreement and only appears to challenge the failure of the Defendant’s representative to explain the impact of the Arbitration Agreement. [Declaration of Darian Wilkins, ¶ 2.] The court, therefore, finds the copy of the signed Agreement valid and will now consider the terms. The Agreement provides in relevant part:

“It is not uncommon for disputes to arise between an employer and an employee. Arbitration is a speedy, impartial and cost-effective way to resolve these disputes. For this reason, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, you and Cedars-Sinai agree that all claims or controversies in any way relating to or associated with your employment or the termination of your employment (“Claims”) will be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. For purposes of this Agreement, Claims includes, but is not limited to, all statutory, contractual and/or common law claims including, but not

limited to, claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; the Family and Medical Leave Act; the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; the California Family Rights Act; the California Labor Code and Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission; the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the Americans With Disabilities Act.”

*3 “This Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims does not apply to: Claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act or Unemployment Insurance claims; Claims which the parties are legally prohibited from submitting to arbitration; Claims under an employee pension or benefit plan, the terms of which contain its own arbitration or claims review procedure; Claims covered by an applicable collective bargaining agreement or the National Labor Relations Act; Claims of employees with a written “Employment Agreement” that contains arbitration provisions.”

“This Agreement does not limit either party’s right, where applicable, to file a charge or participate in an investigative proceeding of any federal, state, or local governmental agency, such as the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or the National Labor Relations Board.”

“The party seeking arbitration must initiate arbitration proceedings by filing with JAMS in Los Angeles County a written demand for arbitration, in accordance with JAMS requirements. Service on Cedars-Sinai shall be made to the Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Organization Development, 8700 Beverly Boulevard, North Tower, Room 2227, Los Angeles, California 90048. Service on the Employee shall be at the Employee’s address of record-with Cedars-Sinai, The arbitration will be heard by a single independent arbitrator. The parties shall attempt in good faith to agree on an arbitrator. In the event no agreement can be reached, the arbitrator shall be appointed in accordance with the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures in effect at the time the Claim is submitted (“JAMS Rules”). The arbitration will be administered by JAMS pursuant to its Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures and subject to JAMS policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness. The arbitrator’s fee will be paid by Cedars-Sinai. In addition, where required by law, Cedars-Sinai shall pay all costs peculiar to the arbitration to the extent such costs would not otherwise be incurred in a court proceeding, and you shall not be required to pay any type or amount of expense if such requirement would invalidate this Agreement or would otherwise be contrary to the law as it exists at the time of the arbitration. The parties shall be entitled to engage in discovery as authorized by the JAMS Rules. By signing this agreement, you acknowledge that you have had a meaningful opportunity to review the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures before signing this Agreement. BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU AND CEDARS-SINAI AGREE THAT CEDARS-SINAI AND YOU WILL HAVE CLAIMS DECIDED BY AN ARBITRATOR RATHER THAN BY A JUDGE OR JURY .”

“If any part of this Agreement is found to be void or unenforceable, that part will be severed and eliminated, and the rest of this Agreement will remain in full force.”

“This Agreement shall be enforceable under and subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. This is the complete agreement of the parties on the subject of arbitration of covered Claims. This Agreement supersedes any prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreement or understanding on the subject. In executing this Agreement, neither party is relying on any representation, oral or written, on the subject of the effect, enforceability or meaning of this Agreement, except as specifically set forth in this Agreement. Each party understands and fully agrees to all the foregoing.”

The court finds the Agreement encompasses all claims alleged in the complaint. The burden falls on Plaintiff to challenge enforceability. (*Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin’l Securities Corp.*, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 413-414; *Gamboia v. Northeast Community Clinic*, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164-165; *Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Ctr., Inc.*, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.) Plaintiff essentially relies on a conclusion of unconscionability based on the failure to explain the terms during the onboarding process. [Wilkins Decl.]

*4 The court first considers the unconscionability arguments as a defense to enforcement of the agreement. Plaintiff presents authority regarding an unfair adhesion contract, a violation of [Labor Code section 450](#), and improper limitation of discovery.

Unconscionability claims have both a “procedural” and “substantive” element. (*Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1531.) “Procedural unconscionability” concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. (*Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc.* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1329.)

“The procedural element focuses on two factors: “oppression” and “surprise.” “Oppression” arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. “Surprise” involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” (*Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.*, *supra*, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1532.) “Substantive unconscionability” involves contracts leading to ““overly harsh”” or ““one-sided”” results.” ... “[U]nconscionability turns ... on an absence of ‘justification ‘for it...’ [and therefore] must be evaluated as of the time the contract was made.” (Ibid.)

In the employment context, a mandatory arbitration agreement is enforceable, if it “(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.” (*Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.) Required execution of an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment may constitute an unconscionable provision, where the contract lacks mutuality and/or imposes a disadvantage on the employee. (*Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.*, *supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 114-118; *Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071-1072.) A showing of procedural unconscionability will not invalidate an arbitration clause, but can lead to greater scrutiny under the substantive standard, thereby supporting invalidation. (*Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc.* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 662, 674 accord *OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 129-130.)

Following *Armendariz* and the continued examination into unequal bargaining circumstances challenging arbitration clauses, California law offers further guidance into the adhesion contract circumstances (e.g. an agreement substantively presented as “take or it leave it” the circumstances of which potentially impose a disadvantage on the employee). “With respect to preemployment arbitration contracts, we have observed that ‘the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.’” (*OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho*, *supra*, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 126-127 accord *Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.*, *supra*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 115; *Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478 [322 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 837]; *Hasty v. American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah* (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1055-1056; *Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 179-181; see *Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc.* (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1351; *Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc.* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 705.)

*5 The court accepts the circumstances, but Plaintiff in no way denies the opportunity to potentially consult another for explanation or consideration of alternatives. Whether Plaintiff may request a waiver and whether Defendant simply rejected said potential request remains unknown. Plaintiff may have still accepted the terms under the circumstances. Again, the opposition lacks any explanation as to the alleged impacts from the acceptance of the terms. The Agreement also provides for limited discovery and Cedars-Sinai payment of all arbitration fees. Such provisions have been the standard for decades and nothing in the subject Agreement in any way strays from the standard, thereby violating [Labor Code section 450](#), or any other standard.

The court therefore finds no factual basis of support for the argument of unconscionability. (*OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho*, *supra*, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 126-127; *Hasty v. American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah*, *supra*, 98 Cal.App.5th 1041 [317 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 309-311]; *Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc.* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 662, 674; *Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc.*, *supra*, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349, 1352-1354.) “[A]lthough adhesion alone generally indicates only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, the potential for overreaching in the employment context warrants close scrutiny of the contract’s terms.” (*Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.*, *supra*, 16 Cal.5th 478 [322 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 838].) The circumstances stated in the declaration of Plaintiff support no finding for a form of procedural or substantive unconscionability.

Finally, the court considers the “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021” (EFAA) preemption claim to the applicable causes of action. The parties agree the EFAA applies to claims arising from sexual harassment, but Cedars-Sinai challenges the sufficiency of the claims, while Plaintiff maintains the operative complaint sufficiently articulates a basis for preemption.

The court reviews limited sections of the EFAA.

(4) Sexual harassment dispute. The term “sexual harassment dispute” means a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.

[9 U.S.C.A. § 401](#)

The next section continues:

(a) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.

[9 U.S.C.A. § 402 \(West\)](#)

(b) Determination of applicability. An issue as to whether this chapter applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement, and irrespective of whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator.

[9 U.S.C.A. § 402](#)

Harassment claims based on gender discrimination encompasses a broad base of conduct. ([Miller v. Department of Corrections](#) (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462; [Accardi v. Superior Court](#) (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 348; see [Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc.](#) (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 585-587 [The court found the language EFAA allows, even requires, the court to determine the sufficiency of the underlying pleading itself—a level of review akin to a demurrer— for purposes of establishing a valid gender/sex harassment claim and therefore EFAA preemption].)

*6 The court broadly relies upon the California Supreme Court’s consideration of sexual harassment, which quoted the United States Supreme Court in its analysis. “The United States Supreme Court has warned that the evidence in a hostile environment sexual harassment case should not be viewed too narrowly: ‘[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” [Citation.]... [T]hat inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target... The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’” (Citation.)” [Miller v. Department of Corrections](#), *supra*, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462.)

The court appreciates the position of Cedars-Sinai in making the distinction in this case between sexual harassment versus sexual discrimination. The court cannot cite to the unpublished authority relied on from the Northern District of California but will clarify the standard. ([Johannessen v. JUUL Labs, Inc.](#) (N.D. Cal., June 24, 2024, No. 3:23-CV-03681-JD) 2024 WL 3173286, at *4; [Lee v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.](#), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184957, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2025).) The court also notes the Second Circuit in fact declined to consider EFAA preemption. [Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated](#) (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 92 [“Defendants briefly argue in their reply brief that the EFAA does not apply to Olivieri’s retaliation claims because such claims do not fall within the definition of a “sexual harassment dispute”].)

The court also notes that reliance on U.S. District Court opinions and out of state Federal Circuit courts are persuasive but not binding on the court. “[T]he decisions of the lower federal courts, while persuasive, are not binding on us. (Citation.) Thus, in the absence of a controlling United States Supreme Court [or California Supreme Court] opinion, we make an independent determination of federal law. ... In short, the presence or absence of a decision by the Ninth Circuit on this issue is not determinative.” ([Forsyth v. Jones](#) (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 776, 782– 783; [Thurston v. Midvale Corp.](#) (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th

634, 640.)

“In the FEHA, the terms ‘discriminate’ and ‘harass’ appear in separate provisions and define distinct wrongs. [¶] Because the FEHA treats harassment in a separate provision, there is no reason to construe the FEHA’s prohibition against discrimination broadly to include harassment.” (*Roby v. McKesson Corp.* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 705.) “[C]laims for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment are distinct causes of action, each arising from different provisions of the FEHA.” (*Miller v. Department of Corrections*, supra, 36 Cal.4th 460 (footnote 5).)

Here, the causes of action contain mostly elemental conclusions with base support arising from allegations of exemption from arbitration under EFAA. [Comp., 12:14-17] In examining the factual allegations however, the court notes that said allegations in fact only articulate discrimination on the basis of sex, with no overt or implied sexual harassment allegations. [Comp., ¶¶ 16-17, 19.] Again, while the court declines to engage in a qualitative examination beyond the parameters of the complaint, the allegations in fact allege discriminatory intent based on sex but otherwise offer no apparent qualifying or sufficient allegations supporting EFAA exemption under the sexual harassment standard. The court therefore finds no basis of exemption under EFAA.

The reply also raises a critical position as to the prospective timing of the application of the statute. Effective March 3, 2022: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C.A. § 402(a).)

*7 The alleged wrongful conduct occurred in May 2022, but employment itself commenced on December 18, 2021. Cedars-Sinai seeks to tether the employment period to the pre-enactment period rather than the alleged harassment period. While employment commenced prior to the enactment of the EFAA, the actual causes of action allegedly accrued after enactment. (*Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc.* (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214, 224.) All claims would be collectively exempt, but the court finds no sexual harassment basis of any claim. (*Doe v. Second Street Corp.* (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 577.) The court therefore notes the position, but the matter is not dispositive to the ruling.

The court also declines to “sever” any “unenforceable terms.” The EFAA statute is not a matter of an offending provision, but a position that permeates the entire agreement. The court declines to take judicial notice of any and all of the trial court orders upholding the subject arbitration clause. None of the orders apparently addressed EFAA either way. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. D-N.]

Cedars-Sinai therefore establishes a basis to compel arbitration, and Plaintiff lacks establishment of any exemption under EFAA under the substantive standard of review. The motion is therefore GRANTED.

“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (*Code Civ. Proc.*, § 1281.4.) The court orders the action stayed.

In light of the above order, the Court also hereby advances and vacates the OSC and CMC set for January 22, 2026. Also, the Court now hereby set this matter for an OSC re Arbitration Status.

The Motion of Defendant to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Proceedings filed by CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER on 05/29/2025 is Granted.

The case is ordered stayed pending binding arbitration as to the entire action.

On the Court’s own motion, the Case Management Conference scheduled for 01/22/2026, and Order to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 01/22/2026 are advanced to this date and vacated.

Order to Show Cause Re: Arbitration Status is scheduled for 08/04/2026 at 08:30 AM in Department 68 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

Clerk is to give notice.

Certificate of Service is attached.

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