

# Risk #8: Opening the Gates: Retail Access to Private Funds and the Coming Regulatory Pressure Points

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For decades, private fund strategies were the domain of institutional investors and the ultra-wealthy. That exclusivity is ending as private strategies migrate into retail vehicles designed to hold illiquid assets within a retail regulatory framework.

Business development companies (“BDCs”), interval funds, and tender offer funds have emerged as the primary retail vehicles. Organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), they offer periodic liquidity, board oversight, and standardized disclosure, while holding fundamentally illiquid assets. Private credit strategies delivered through BDCs and interval funds have gained the most traction as an initial bridge to non-institutional capital.

SEC Chair Paul S. Atkins has [endorsed what he calls the “responsible retailization” of private markets](#), describing a framework that widens access “without weakening protection” through appropriate guardrails. He has rejected the idea that risk alone justifies exclusion: “Private markets are not without uncertainty. But the presence of risk is not grounds for the perpetuation of exclusion.” In March 2026, [the SEC convened a public roundtable on the retailization](#) of private and alternative investments, focusing heavily on valuation practices and governance in registered vehicles that hold private assets. The discussion also revisited whether the “accredited investor” definition should be broadened toward financial sophistication—a change that could expand direct access to private funds beyond the more traditional structures that have been used in recent years (sometimes referred to as “registered wrappers”).

However, the challenge is inherent to the model, not merely philosophical. Private credit’s historical resilience has rested on committed capital. Retail vehicles preserve that structure, but liquidity constraints arise when redemption demand exceeds the quarterly cap. That design works—until it doesn’t. This concern has become more pronounced as higher interest rates have increased liquidity pressures on both private funds and their investors.

## **The Regulatory Pressure Points**

**Liquidity, Repurchases, and Valuation.** The core tension arises from repurchase features layered onto illiquid portfolios. In stable markets, model-based NAVs and moderate redemption levels can appear durable. In stressed markets, liquidity tightens and valuation judgments come to the forefront.

Expect regulators, particularly for registered funds, to focus closely on the fair valuation governance frameworks implemented under Rule 2a-5 of the 1940 Act, including model-based fair value determinations for illiquid assets and board oversight of pricing processes. Recent experience in certain non-traded BDCs shows that valuation is only part of the story. Quarterly repurchase programs, typically capped at a percentage of outstanding shares, can face redemption demand that exceeds available liquidity. When that happens, funds can prorate redemptions or revise liquidity terms consistent with their governing documents. The structure operates as designed, but in doing so highlights a fundamental feature of these vehicles: liquidity is limited precisely when investor demand for it is highest, drawing regulatory and political attention, particularly around disclosure and investor expectations.

**Suitability and Fiduciary Obligations.** As private market exposure expands in retail accounts, suitability extends beyond point-of-sale documentation. Products marketed to older investors, retirement savers, or yield-oriented clients will draw heightened attention where fees are layered and liquidity is conditional.

Regulators will examine whether product design supports recommendations that can be defended under fiduciary standards. Disclosures regarding fee structures and redemption mechanics will shape how fiduciary obligations are assessed. In a stress scenario, those disclosures will be reviewed with the benefit of hindsight.

**Disclosure and Fee Transparency.** Retail distribution heightens disclosure risk. Management fees, incentive allocations, fund expenses, and distribution costs must be presented clearly and coherently. Marketing materials must explain liquidity mechanics in plain terms and what occurs when redemption demand exceeds available cash.

Liquidity that appears robust in offering documents but contracts under stress will invite scrutiny.

## **The Examination Lens**

The SEC has already signaled its focus: the [2026 Examination Priorities](#) identify retail-oriented risks in detail, including fiduciary and suitability assessments of complex or illiquid products. Interval funds, tender offer funds, and retail-oriented BDC structures should expect exam teams to evaluate them through a retail investor protection lens.

### **The 401(k) Frontier**

The most politically sensitive boundary involves defined contribution plans. Moving private market exposure into 401(k)s introduces a different category of risk. These plans require daily valuation, participant-level liquidity, and compliance with ERISA fiduciary standards. Private assets fit uneasily within that structure.

Target-date funds and collective investment trusts offer structural pathways, but they do not eliminate the mismatch between daily participant transactions and multi-year asset exit horizons. A liquidity event affecting retirement savers would raise broader policy questions about the appropriateness of retail access.

Chair Atkins' emphasis on "post-tax, pre-retirement dollars" suggests a regulatory distinction. Taxable accounts and IRAs may allow greater flexibility, while 401(k) vehicles may face tighter constraints.

### **Looking Ahead**

Retailization has been framed as democratization. In a credit downturn, regulators may ask whether product structures kept pace with distribution. Liquidity mechanics, valuation governance, and disclosure practices will be assessed under stress. The durability of retail private market exposure will ultimately be tested when markets tighten—and judged by how those vehicles and their regulators respond.

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