Lidia Soto sued her former employer, Motel 6 Operating, L.P., for violation of Labor Code § 226(a) for failing to include the monetary value of accrued vacation pay in its employees' wage statements. Soto sued in her individual capacity and also on behalf of all aggrieved workers under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"). The trial court sustained the employer's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Section 226(a) does not require employers to include the monetary value of accrued vacation time in employee wage statements until and unless a payment is due at the time of the termination of the employment relationship – before that point, accrued but unused vacation time is not a quantifiable amount of wages.
Lawyers In Putative Class Action Were Properly Disqualified Based Upon Representation Of Another Class
Walker v. Apple, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 5th 1098 (2016)
The trial court disqualified the attorneys for a putative class led by Stacey and Tyler Walker based upon the lawyers' concurrent representation of a certified class in another wage and hour class action (the Felczer class) pending against the same employer (Apple). In its disqualification motion, Apple asserted that in order to advance the interests of its clients in the Walker case, the lawyers would have to cross-examine one of their own clients from the Felczer class in an adverse manner. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding the firm represents the former store manager in the Felczer class action and that a disqualifying conflict exists between her interests and the Walkers' interests.
$179,000 Penalty Upheld For Employer's Failure To Maintain Workers' Compensation
Taylor v. Dep't of Industrial Relations, 4 Cal. App. 5th 801 (2016)
Following an inspection, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") discovered that Aaron's Automotive ("Taylor") had been in operation since 2007 but had never acquired workers' compensation insurance coverage as required by Labor Code § 3700. The DLSE issued a Penalty Assessment Order, assessing a penalty against Taylor in the amount of $179,329.60. The Court of Appeal rejected Taylor's construction of Labor Code § 3722(b), involving the meaning of being uninsured during the calendar year preceding the determination and concluded that "even if Taylor's statutory interpretation is correct, the penalty assessed by the DLSE in this case would not be invalidated. Nor would the amount of the penalty imposed be any less."
Union Member's Hostile Work Environment Claim Was Not Preempted By Federal Law
Matson v. UPS, 840 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2016)
Mary Matson, a member of the Teamsters Union, worked as a "combination worker" unloading and sorting packages at UPS's Boeing Field International hub in Seattle. During her employment, Matson allegedly complained that because of her gender she was subject to unfair and demeaning treatment in the workplace. UPS subsequently fired Matson for "proven dishonesty," relying upon results of an investigation into whether Matson had falsified delivery records. Matson filed a grievance, and a joint Teamsters/UPS labor panel affirmed her discharge. Matson then filed suit against UPS alleging that her termination was unlawfully motivated by race and gender discrimination and in retaliation for her prior complaints; that she was subjected to a gender-based hostile work environment -- a claim largely, but not exclusively, based on the way UPS assigned work; and that UPS had committed various common law torts. UPS removed the state court action to federal court and moved for summary judgment, which was granted on the merits, except with respect to Matson's gender discrimination, retaliation and gender-based hostile work-environment claim, which UPS asserted was preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") on the grounds that the question of whether UPS assigned work based on factors other than gender required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"). The district court rejected UPS's LMRA preemption argument, and the case proceeded to trial.
The jury sided with UPS on Matson's claims that her termination was motivated by gender and retaliation, but it awarded Matson $500,000 on the hostile work-environment claim. After UPS's post-trial motion, the district court ordered a new trial based on LMRA preemption of that part of the hostile environment claim related to the assignment of work – i.e., accepting the argument that it had previously rejected. UPS won the second trial in which the jury considered whether there was proof of a hostile work environment based on conduct other than the assignment of work, and Matson appealed. In this opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that because Matson's hostile work-environment claim could be resolved without interpretation of the CBA, the LMRA did not preempt the claim. The Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration of the amount of damages owed to Matson. See also Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2016) (amount in controversy requirement was satisfied where the potential cost of complying with injunctive relief was considered along with plaintiff's claim for damages).